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Counterpoint: The Insurance Institute for 
Highway Safety Study Actually Found Cities 
Using Red Light Cameras Had Higher Red 
Light Running Fatality Rates 
 
Barbara Langland-Orban, PhD, Etienne E. Pracht, PhD, John T. Large, PhD 
 
ABSTRACT 
In February 2011, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) disseminated their research study that compared red 
light running traffic fatality rates between cities that implemented red light camera (RLC) programs with cities that did not. 
The IIHS researchers concluded cities that used RLCs had a significantly larger percentage reduction in both red light 
running (RLR) fatality rates and total fatality rates at signalized intersections. Because a previous IIHS study on RLCs was 
found to use flawed research methods, as well as to incorrectly report findings, the current IIHS RLC analysis is reviewed for 
adherence to scientific methods. Our review reveals the 2011 IIHS study is logically flawed and violates basic scientific 
research methods that are required for a study’s findings to be valid. It has neither internal nor external validity. More 
importantly, the IIHS did not fully explain the results of its analysis. Correctly interpreting its model’s results actually shows 
that cities using RLCs had an estimated higher rate of red light running fatalities, specifically 25%, than cities that did not 
use RLCs in the period “after” cameras were used. Further, the IIHS study was only able to make statements suggesting 
favorable results from the use of RLCs due to the biased selection of sampled cities. The red light running fatality rate as well 
as the total fatality rate at all signalized intersections in cities that used cameras was higher in both the “before” and “after” 
time periods, which affirms that superior interventions exist. Also, we explain the IIHS’ financial conflict of interest regarding 
photo enforcement.  
Florida Public Health Review, 2012; 9, 1-8. 
 
Background 
In February 2011, the Insurance Institute for 
Highway Safety (IIHS) disseminated their study that 
concluded cities with red light camera (RLC) 
programs experienced a greater percent reduction in 
their red light running (RLR) fatality rate and, to a 
lesser extent, in their total fatality rate at signalized 
intersections, relative to cities that did not 
implement RLC programs (Hu, McCartt, & Teoh, 
2011). In contrast to this IIHS conclusion, 
Langland-Orban, Large and Pracht (2011) published 
an analysis that summarized studies identified as the 
best designed RLC research in a National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
compendium (Decina et al, 2007). Most of these 
studies found that fatalities at RLC sites occurred in 
larger number than at comparison sites, thereby 
yielding conclusions directly contrary to the 2011 
IIHS study. A major difference is that the studies, 
classified as best designed, had evaluated actual RLC 
sites and adjusted for traffic volume, whereas the 
IIHS study analyzed city-wide data, not specific to 
camera sites. 
The controversy surrounding RLCs was 
disclosed in the Office of the Majority Leader’s  
 
Report (2001) entitled The Red Light Running Crisis: 
Is It Intentional? The report explained that when 
yellow light timings are correctly set at 
intersections, red light running is a relatively 
infrequent occurrence. However, for RLC programs 
to be profitable, it is necessary to shorten yellow 
light timings to create a larger “dilemma zone” 
where drivers cannot stop in time and hence receive 
a ticket for entering the intersection on a red light. 
Further, RLCs can encourage drivers to stop 
abruptly in attempts to avoid a ticket, which is a 
hazardous driving action that is known to increase 
rear end crashes.  The Majority Leader’s Report also 
explained that, in 1994, the Institute of 
Transportation Engineers (ITE) recommended that 
when red light running is a problem at an 
intersection, the yellow light timing can be 
lengthened (the prevailing standard), or 
alternatively, enforcement (tickets) can be used (a 
new provision). This change to permit enforcement 
was endorsed by the Federal Highway 
Administration in 2000, which allows for creating 
“dilemma zones” at signalized intersections that are 
associated with red light running and thus increase 
RLC tickets. 
Because the IIHS findings on the association 
between RLCs and fatalities is contrary to the RLC 
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studies classified as best designed in the NHTSA 
compendium, the 2011 IIHS study is reviewed here 
for adherence to basic research methods, which are 
required for valid conclusions to be drawn. It should 
be noted that a previous IIHS study on RLCs 
(Retting & Kyrychenko, 2002) was found to have 
used flawed research methods, as well as to 
incorrectly report findings, rendering the findings 
invalid (Burkey & Obeng, 2004; Large, Orban, & 
Pracht, 2008). In addition, the IIHS financial conflict 
of interest regarding photo enforcement is 
explained.  
 
Critique of the IIHS Methods 
The IIHS analysis included 14 cities that used 
camera programs and compared them with 48 cities 
that did not. The “before period” was defined as the 
combined years of 1992–1996 when none of the 62 
cities had cameras. The “after period” was defined as 
the years 2004–2008. The 14 “camera” cities were 
reported to have used RLCs at some sites 
throughout this five-year period, whereas the 48 
comparison cities never used RLCs. 
The IIHS study developed two Poisson 
regression models. The first model, reportedly, used 
red light running (RLR) fatalities per 100,000-
population as the outcome measure (dependent and 
continuous variable). The second model reportedly 
used fatalities per 100,000-population at signalized 
intersections (also a continuous variable). The use of 
the word “reportedly” is explained below in facts 4 
and 5. The determinants (independent variables) 
used to estimate each outcome were as follows: 
• Land area in square miles 
• Thousands of persons (population) per 
square mile 
• “After” camera period (0 = 1992-1996; 1 = 
2004-2008) 
• Camera cities (0 = never used cameras; 1 = 
cameras in 2004-2008) 
• Interaction between “after” camera period 
and camera cities 
Five facts are immediately apparent about the 
research design, which jeopardize the internal and 
external validity of their findings.   
(1) The Poisson regression models excluded 
variables (determinants) known to be 
associated with traffic fatalities, such as 
changes in public policies  or engineering 
improvements made during or between the 
study periods. For example, some states, 
e.g., Florida, repealed their motorcycle 
helmet law between the two time periods, 
which was associated with increased 
fatalities. It is noteworthy that the Federal 
Highway Administration’s RLC study 
(Council et al., 2005) suggested that 
fatalities should be ignored in RLC analyses 
because they are an infrequent outcome and 
result from issues associated with “occupant 
age, restraint use, and the type and size of 
vehicles involved.” The IIHS study likewise 
did not consider these FHWA-cited factors, 
which are associated with fatalities. By 
excluding factors known to be associated 
with fatalities, the IIHS study likely suffers 
from omitted variables bias (i.e., under-
specification). Unless the excluded variables 
were statistically independent from those 
that were included, the influence of the 
former will be, incorrectly, attributed to the 
latter. 
(2) Two of their explanatory variables (“land 
area” and “persons per square mile”) are not 
established factors associated with motor 
vehicle crashes or fatalities and have not 
been used in other RLC research. Whereas 
variable selection is to some extent 
subjective, a clear theoretical explanation 
for a variable’s inclusion must be provided. 
If no theoretical basis exists for including 
variables, they should be left out of the 
model since their inclusion can alter 
(distort) the findings. This is especially true 
because the authors found no statistical 
significance for these factors. 
(3) Assuming that the dependent variable for 
each model is defined as reported, some 
variables are included more than one time, 
making them redundant. For example, 
population is the denominator in both 
outcome measures reported (e.g., fatalities 
per 100,000-population), as well as a 
numerator in the variable “population per 
square mile.” Further, land density is an 
independent variable and is also used in a 
second independent variable “population 
per square mile.” This introduces the 
problem of multi-collinearity, meaning 
variables used in the model are highly 
correlated and coefficient estimates, such as 
the association between cameras and 
fatalities, can be inaccurate as a 
consequence.  
(4) The authors report their dependent 
variables as rates (e.g., fatalities per 
100,000-population), which are defined as 
continuous. They then proceed with 
Poisson regression which is designed for 
count data (not rates). If these first four 
points appear confusing, it stems from the 
authors’ erroneous use of variables and 
descriptions. The review will proceed 
assuming that the dependent variables were 
actual counts. 
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(5) If the use of a Poisson regression is 
appropriate and the dependent variable is 
indeed a discrete number (i.e., count data) 
then the correct interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients is “a change in the 
number of fatalities, holding the population 
density and land area constant.” This is, of 
course, qualitatively and quantitatively 
different from a percentage change in the rate 
of such fatalities. Examination of the 
“before” camera period data illustrates the 
importance of this distinction. About 93% of 
all camera cities had at least seven fatal 
RLR accidents in the 1992-1996 period, 
with most having substantially higher 
numbers.  In contrast, 56% of the non-
camera cities had six or fewer RLR 
fatalities. The authors of the IIHS study 
ignored the fact that the non-camera cities 
had substantially fewer RLR related 
fatalities in the “before” period, when 
cameras were not used in any of the 62 
studied cities. Of even greater impact, 23% 
of the non-camera cities had two or fewer 
(including zero) such accidents. Because no 
city can improve its fatality rate if it is 
already zero, the simple fact is that the 
“number” in particular, and by extension 
the “percentage change in the rate,” of 
fatalities had much less room for 
improvement in the non-camera cities.   
 
Review of the IIHS Findings 
Ignoring the obvious problem relating to the 
use of “percentage change in rate” as discussed 
above, the following provides a more detailed review 
of the results and interpretations. Table 1 provides a 
portion of Table 1 from the IIHS results. The IIHS 
reported that cities using RLCs had a larger percent 
reduction in red light running fatality rates. This 
misrepresents their findings. Cities that used RLCs 
had a substantially higher rate of red light running 
fatalities in both time periods, “before” and “after” 
camera use, relative to cities that did not use RLCs 
(point 5).  Similarly, cities that used RLCs had a 
higher fatality rate at signalized intersections than 
cities that did not use them, in both time periods. 
Cities starting from a higher absolute base can show 
greater relative improvement than those already 
performing well, even in the absence of an 
intervention, hence the larger percentage rate 
change in the “camera cities.” 
Table 1 also reveals that the IIHS method for 
selecting comparison cities violated research 
methods since the comparison cities (no RLC use) 
averaged much lower fatality rates in the “before” 
period, relative to camera cities. Scientific research 
methods require that the comparison group is 
selected to be similar to the treated group, in this 
case “camera cities.” The fact that the two groups 
have a large difference in fatality rates in the 
“before” period reflects bias in the selection of the 
comparison group, which jeopardizes the validity of 
the findings (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). 
Further, the IIHS included cities that had 
extreme fatality rates. Extreme rates, whether high 
or low, may regress toward the mean (the average) 
absent any intervention, meaning high rates may fall 
over time while low rates may rise. Extreme rates 
may also indicate the presence of factors that are 
unique to the particular observations. For example, 
within the context of the IIHS study, an extremely 
high rate in a particular city may be explained by 
yellow light intervals that are systematically shorter 
on average compared to the remaining cities in the 
analysis. 
Scientific research methods allow for including 
sites with extreme rates; however, the comparison 
sites must be selected to be similarly extreme, 
whether high or low (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). 
Instead, the extremes are dissimilar because 26 
(54%) of the 48 comparison (no-camera) cities have 
RLR fatality rates per 100,000 population that were 
less than 0.4 in the “before” period; two of which had 
a rate of zero, making a reduction impossible. In 
contrast, only one of the 14 cities using cameras 
(7%) had a rate less than 0.4. 
A specific case in point of an extreme was 
Phoenix, a camera city. Its status as an outlier is 
illustrated by the fact that it had an RLR fatality 
rate of 1.82 per 100,000 population in the “before” 
period, which is almost four standard deviations 
above the average of the sample. The Phoenix rate 
declined to 1.01 in the “after” period. The inclusion 
of Phoenix reflects further selection bias due to its 
extremely high fatality rate, which is then compared 
with cities that already have low fatality rates and 
then ultimately reporting the findings as percent 
changes only. According to the IIHS study results, 
Phoenix had a 45% decrease in its red light running 
fatality rate. It is noteworthy that the average 
“before” rate in the non-camera cities was 0.4, or, 
stated differently, the Phoenix “before” period rate 
was over 300% higher compared to the non-camera 
city average. Given its starting position, interpreting 
a 45% decrease as evidence of RLC effectiveness is 
faulty because the fatality rate of 1.01 in the “after” 
period is still extraordinarily high and 2.7 standard 
deviations higher than the sample average. 
The dynamic of bias described above permeates 
the interpretation of the regression results as 
revealed in Table 2, which replicates Table 2 from 
the IIHS study, reporting the results from their 
statistical analysis of RLR fatalities per 100,000 
population. 
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The IIHS researchers wrote the following about 
the cities: “The rate of fatal red light running crashes 
between 1992-96 and 2004-08 was reduced by an 
estimated 16 percent ([exp(-0.1709)-1]×100) for cities 
without camera programs and by an estimated 36 percent 
([exp(-0.1709-0.2809)-1]×100) for cities with 
cameras.” This is a favorable presentation of the 
findings, but distorts actual results because the 
authors excluded the estimate for the “camera cities” 
variable, which is both large and positive. 
Table 3 presents our interpretation of their 
results and summarizes the percent differences, 
estimated relative to the base case. The base case is 
the “before” period in cities not using cameras. Thus, 
cities using cameras had an estimated 65% higher 
rate of red light running fatalities in the “before” 
period. This extreme starting position undoubtedly 
impacts the ending position. Cities not using 
cameras had an estimated 16% decrease in the RLR 
fatality rate in the “after” period, despite the fact that 
some started with a rate of absolute zero. Both of 
these findings are, nonetheless, correctly reported in 
the IIHS report. However, cities that used cameras 
had an estimated 5% higher fatality rate in the 
“after” period relative to the base case, a finding not 
reported by the IIHS researchers, albeit this 
difference is unlikely to be statistically significant. 
The important question is what was the 
difference between cities using vs. not using cameras 
in the “after” camera period? The “after” period 
estimate (-0.17) is the same for both groups. Thus, 
the difference between the two groups is the “cities 
with cameras” estimate (0.4998) plus the 
“interaction” estimate (-0.28). Thus, cities using 
cameras are estimated to have a 25% higher red light 
running fatality rate [(EXP(0.4998-0.28))-1] in the 
“after” period relative to cities not using cameras, 
despite the greater reported percent reduction in the 
former. The authors’ incorrect conclusions were 
based on the interaction effect only and not the 
result from both the main effect (cities with cameras) 
and the interaction effect. 
   
Understanding the IIHS Conflict of Interest 
The IIHS is supported and funded by 
automobile insurance companies and associations, 
and their financial interest in traffic tickets and 
ambivalence toward lowering crash costs were 
explained nearly 50 years ago by Ralph Nader, an 
expert on traffic safety.  In Nader’s landmark book, 
Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed in Dangers of the 
American Automobile, a chapter titled “The traffic 
safety establishment: Damn the driver and spare the car,” 
explained the IIHS interests. Nader (1965) described 
the IIHS as part of a private “traffic safety 
establishment,” which was focused on defending 
business interests and profits, while subjugating 
evidenced-based interventions that reduce injuries 
and fatalities. He wrote, “Under existing business 
values, potential safety advances are subordinated to other 
investments, priorities, preferences, and themes designed to 
maximize profit. 
Nader (1965) described the private “traffic safety 
establishment” as focusing exclusively on driver 
behavior, instead of engineering improvements that 
are associated with the prevention of crashes and 
injuries. Nader explained that crashes resulting from 
engineering defects of automobiles can be imputed to 
drivers, which is also true of roadway engineering 
defects, such as yellow light timings that are set too 
short, thereby forcing red light running. Nader 
explained the myopic focus of the private “traffic 
safety establishment” as follows: 
Today almost every program is aimed at the 
driver – at educating him, exhorting him, 
watching him, judging him, punishing him, 
compiling records about his driving violations . . 
.    
Although published in 1965, this is an accurate 
description of photo enforcement programs.   
Nader also explained why automobile insurance 
companies are ambivalent about reducing crash 
costs. First, insurance companies are able to gain 
approval from state regulators to raise insurance 
premiums to cover higher losses, making them 
indifferent about loss prevention, since increased 
losses justify increased premiums, passing higher 
crash costs on to drivers. Second, automobile 
insurance companies earn more profit from 
investment income (investing premiums collected 
from drivers) than from underwriting activities. 
Thus, higher premiums produce more money to 
invest and hence more profit for insurance 
companies. 
The importance of these principles is evidenced 
in the average automobile insurance rate change that 
occurred nationwide in 2009. From 2004 to 2008, 
the annualized rate of premium increase was about 
3.2%, consistent with inflation (U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008). In 2008, 
the real estate bubble burst and the U.S. stock 
market crashed, with average stock market returns 
being down over 37% (Anspach, 2011). This loss 
may explain the large increase in automobile 
insurance premiums in 2009, which jumped by 
double digits across all states. For example, average 
automobile insurance rates in Florida increased by 
58%, averaging $1,055 in 2008 and $1,668 in 2009 
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Table 1. Table 1 from the IIHS Study - 
Average Annual per capita Rates of Fatal Red Light Running Crashes and All Fatal Crashes at Signalized 
Intersections for Cities with and without Red Light Camera Enforcement Programs, 1992-96 and 2004-08 
 14 cities with  
camera programs 
48 cities without  
camera programs 
 1992-96  2004-08  Percent 
change  
1992-96  2004-08  Percent 
change  
Average annual population (million)  9.02  10.08  11.7  17.07  19.08  11.7  
Average annual rate of fatal red light running 
crashes per million population  
7.16  4.66  -34.9  4.79  4.10  -14.4  
Average annual rate of all fatal crashes at 
signalized intersections per million population  







Table 2: Table 2 from the IIHS Study - 
Poisson Model of the Effects of Red Light Camera Enforcement on Average Annual per capita Rate of  
Fatal Red Light Running Crashes 
Parameter Estimate Standard error p value 
Intercept 1.7050 0.1547 <0.0001
* 
Land area in square miles 0.0001 0.0003 0.6391 
Population density (thousands of persons per square mile)  -0.0371 0.0191 0.0527 
After period (2004-08) vs. before period (1992-96)  -0.1709 0.0678 0.0117* 
Cities that implemented red light cameras vs. cities that did not  0.4998 0.1436 0.0005* 







Table 3: Summary of Percent Differences 
Estimate 
 
-0.17 0.4998 -0.28 
 
  
Before = 0 No Camera = 0 After & camera = 1 
 Period Cameras After = 1 Camera = 1 All other cases = 0 % Difference 
Before No 0 0 0 
 Before Yes 0 0.4998 0 0.65 
After  No -0.17 0 0 -0.16 
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www.CarInsurance.com (2011). Thus, auto 
insurance rates jumped subsequent to insurance 
company investment losses, suggesting the increase 
may have occurred to achieve return on investment 
expectations, and not due to a large increase in 
individual risk relative to crashes and injuries. 
This supports Nader’s assertion that higher 
losses are simply passed on to drivers in the form of 
higher premiums, as there was no large increase in 
individual risk. Instead, traffic fatalities had declined. 
The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (2010) reported that fatal crashes 
declined between 2007 and 2009. For example, the 
number of fatal motor vehicle traffic crashes declined 
from 34,172 in 2008 to 30,797 in 2009, representing 
an almost 10% drop. In addition, the rate of fatalities 
per 100,000 population declined from 1.26 to 1.13. 
The drop in fatalities is in accordance with the 
reduction in miles traveled that followed the 
recession: billions of miles traveled declined from 
3,032 to 2,979 in respectively, 2007 and 2009. These 
data cast serious doubt on the notion that premiums 
increased in response to increased risk. 
Further, automobile insurance profitability had 
increased prior to 2004 after the insurance industry 
developed new pricing tools in 2000. Instead of 
categorizing drivers into four or five tiers for 
underwriting purposes, insurance companies began 
using thousands of factors to determine a driver’s 
rate (Oster, 2004). A proliferation of traffic tickets, 
via photo enforcement, creates a proliferation of 
factors (tickets) to use in underwriting that justify 
premium increases. Hence, the automobile insurance 
industry has a financial interest in advocating for 
photo enforcement. 
Tickets can result in multi-year automobile 
insurance increases from surcharges due to points on 
a driver’s license and/or from underwriting 
penalties. In Florida, a state insurance specialist 
explained that RLC tickets can be used in 
underwriting, similar to other tickets, to increase a 
driver’s automobile insurance rate, even though the 
tickets do not add points to a driver’s license (Rick 
Lunsford, personal communication, July 29, 2011). It 
was noted that practices vary among insurance 
companies, such that drivers would need to contact 
their own company to ascertain the percent increase 
and duration (years) of any penalty from a camera 
ticket. 
It is not surprising that public officials can be 
misinformed about the relative effectiveness of traffic 
tickets and photo enforcement in reducing crashes. 
Ralph Nader (1965) had also explained that the 
private “traffic safety establishment” has inserted 
themselves as educators to public officials and law 
enforcement regarding traffic safety. He explained 
that the merging of public and private funds is a 
“recurrent practice in the traffic safety establishment and 
assures the participation of industry people directly in 
official programs.” This continues today, as evidenced 
by agendas from the Governors Highway Safety 
Administration (GHSA) annual meetings. The 
GHSA membership includes highway safety 
representatives from each state. Insurance 
companies and camera vendors participate as 
associate members (Governors Highway Safety 
Administration [GHSA], 2011), and IIHS 
representatives and other special interests 
participate as speakers. For example, in 2010, a 
representative from the Partnership for Advancing 
Road Safety presented “Automated Enforcement: 
We’ve Got Your Number” (GHSA, 2010), which is 
an organization funded by traffic camera vendors 
(thenewspaper.com, 2010). Whereas free speech laws 
permit such presentations, it illustrates how the 
process allows proprietary interests to influence 
public officials, apparently absent disclosures of 
financial conflicts of interest.   
 
Conclusions 
The 2011 IIHS study actually found that cities 
that used cameras had noticeably higher red light 
running fatality rates than cities that did not use 
cameras in both “before” and “after” time periods. 
This finding was also true regarding the total 
fatality rate at signalized intersections. This 
suggests other interventions were more effective in 
lowering fatality rates at signalized intersections. 
However, the authors of the IIHS study did not cite 
these findings. Further, the extremely high rates of 
red light running fatalities in the “after” period in 
both Phoenix (1.01 per 100,000 population) and 
Bakersfield (1.06 per 100,000 population), which 
used cameras, are evidence that other interventions 
may prove particularly effective in these cities if ever 
implemented, as comparison cities (no-camera) 
averaged 0.41 per 100,000-population in the “after” 
period. 
Further, the impropriety of the IIHS research 
approach, which uses cities as the unit of analysis 
instead of RLC sites, is evidenced by the 
Washington and Shin (2005) analysis of the 10 RLC 
sites in Phoenix. Washington and Shin (2005) 
analyzed crashes and injuries at RLC and 
comparison sites in Phoenix, and adjusted for traffic 
volume. They concluded: (1) total crashes did not 
change at RLC sites; (2) the net safety benefit was 
negligible since RLCs were not associated with 
reducing injuries or fatalities; (3) spillover effects 
were not found; they wrote: “the findings may suggest 
motorists are aware of which approaches have cameras 
and which do not;” (4) the RLC sites had a higher 
percent of fatal angle crashes, relative to comparison 
sites, in the “after” period; and (5) the cost of 
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fatalities was excluded from the economic analysis 
(meaning the negligible safety benefit that was 
reported is incorrect because the higher fatal crash 
costs at RLC sites were excluded from the economic 
analysis). As the Washington and Shin (2005) 
analysis has revealed, analyzing only RLC and 
comparison sites within a community produces 
contrasting results than analyzing aggregated data 
from all signalized intersections within a community 
(as done by the IIHS). 
Meanwhile, the U.S. PIRG (2011) has published 
recommendations regarding RLCs that are designed 
to advance the public’s interests when government 
entities consider camera programs. These 
recommendations can also be used to evaluate 
existing RLC programs to assess adherence and, 
thereby, determine if cameras are used for public 
safety or for advancing private business interests.      
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